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NOTE
REMEDIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 553 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: A CRITICAL
EVALUATION OF UNITED
STATES STEEL AND WESTERN OIL & GAS
Under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),1
federal administrative agencies must in most instances2 follow definite
procedures when promulgating rules.3 Many rules are challenged on
the ground that the promulgating agency did not comply with the re-
quirements of section 553. The overwhelming majority of the courts
that sustain such challenges immediately invalidate the challenged rule.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
2. Under certain circumstances, agencies need not follow any set procedures when promul-
gating rules that have the force and effect of law. See note 3 and text accompanying notes 15-19
infra.
3. The APA prescribes two general sets of procedural requirements. The first set contains
the procedures required for what is commonly called "informal" rulemaking. These procedures,
set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), are the topic of this note. The second set contains the proce-
dures involved in "formal" rulemaking. Formal rulemaking is essentially informal rulemaking
plus hearings and elaborate record-keeping. See id §§ 556-557. For a discussion of formal and
informal rulemaking procedure, see 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 6:1-6:3 (2d
ed. 1978); Auerbach, InformalRule Making: 4 Proposed Relationshp Between 4dministrative Pro-
cedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 15 (1977); Fuchs, Development and Divers//cation
in dministrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83 (1977).
Generally, formal procedures are required only when a statute calls for hearings "on the
record," either in those words or in similar language. United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 234-38(1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972);
Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 119 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally Robinson, The Mak-
ing ofAdministrative Policy:Another Look at Rulemaking andAdudiation and.4dministraive Pro-
cedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970). Most other rulemaking is informal.
Certain agency actions, such as statements of policy, and some rulemaking, require no proce-
dures. For discussion of situations in which no procedures are required see National Retired
Teachers Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978);
Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1111-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Dow Chem., USA
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 464 F. Supp. 904, 908-10 (W.D. La. 1979); Asimow, Public
Parlticpation in the Adoption of Interpretative Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 521
(1977); Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption ofRules of GeneralAppl'cability: The Need/or Pro-
cedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972). See also text
accompanying notes 15-19 infra.
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In the recent cases of United States Steel Corp. v. EP4 4 and Western Oil
& Gas Association v. EP4,a however, the Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits sustained procedural challenges but left the
improperly promulgated rules temporarily in effect. 6
In response to this recent departure from precedent, this note ex-
amines the question of what remedy is appropriate following a success-
ful procedural challenge to a rule promulgated pursuant to section 553.
Part one outlines the procedures prescribed by section 553 and surveys
the cases in which courts have fashioned remedies following a finding
of agency noncompliance with this statute. Part two examines the com-
peting considerations in cases involving successful procedural chal-
lenges to informal rulemaking, and suggests that the formulation of a
remedy requires an equitable, balancing approach. This approach al-
lows a court to be responsive to exigent circumstances in a given case,
avoiding an often unjust and unreasonable result. Part three is a criti-
cal evaluation of United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas in light of
the balancing approach discussed in part two.
I. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR SECTION 553 VIOLATIONS
Congress passed the APA in an effort "to improve the administra-
tion of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure."7 Section
553 of the Act prescribes the minimum8 procedures that agencies are in
most instances obliged to follow when promulgating rules.9 The
rulemaking process under section 553 commences when the agency
4. 649 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1981).
5. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. See text accompanying notes 104-08 infra.
7. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 752,79th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1945), reprinted in LEO-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 187 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
8. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) with id. §§ 556-557. See note 3 supra.
9. Section 553 reads, in pertinent part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply-
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an op-
portunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the
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publishes notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.10 The
agency then receives and considers comment from interested parties."
Following the comment period, the agency publishes a final rule' 2
along with a statement of its basis and purpose.' 3 The final rule can be
effective no sooner than thirty days from the date of its publication in
final form.14
Section,553 allows agencies to forego the above procedures in cer-
tain situations. If "a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States. . . [or] a matter relating to agency management or personnel or
to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" is the subject of
rulemaking, the promulgating agency may disregard the procedures of
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose ....
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than
30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with
the rule.
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). The type of notice that an agency must give has been at
issue in a number of cases. In general, the notice must afford "interested parties a reasonable
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process." Forester v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The notice must specifically announce that the
agency intends to promulgate a rule. National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Also, the notice must reach all similarly situated parties, not just selected indi-
viduals. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1972). See also American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA 568 F.2d 284, 291-92 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Daniels, 418
F.Supp. 1074 (D.S.D. 1976).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
12. Final rules may differ substantially from proposed rules. See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v.
Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980); South Terminal Corp. v.
EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1974). One commentator has proposed that, in such a case, an addi-
tional notice and comment period be instituted prior to the effective date of the rule. Comment,
The Needfor an Additional Notice and Comment Period When Final Rules Differ Substantially
From Interim Rules, 1981 DUKE L.J. 377.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). The courts have generally held that the statement of basis and
purpose need not contain specific details and findings of fact to support the agency's decisions.
See, eg., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975);
American Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1204-05 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The statement
must, however, "respond in a reasoned manner to the comments received,.. . explain how the
agency resolved any significant problems raised by the comments, and. . . show how that resolu-
tion led the agency to the ultimate rule." Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Similarly, the statement "must be sufficiently detailed and informative to allow a searching judi-
cial scrutiny of how and why the regulations were actually adopted." Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501
F.2d 722, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But cf. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator Hearing
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other
Federal Statutes, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 721, 754-55 (1975). ("There is not the slightest indication that
the purpose of the notice-and-comment proceeding was to develop a record by which a reviewing
court could test the validity of the rule which the Administrator finally adopted.")
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
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the section.' 5 The agency may also disregard the procedures when "in-
terpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure, or practice" are involved. 16
Section 553 also contains two "good cause" exceptions to its proce-
dural requirements.' 7 First, if "the agency for good cause finds . . .
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest,' u8 it may forego notice and
comment. The second "good cause" exception allows agencies to make
rules effective in less than thirty days upon "good cause found and pub-
lished with the rule."19
Since the enactment of the APA, numerous rules have been chal-
lenged on the ground that the promulgating agency did not comply
with the procedural requirements of section 553.20 Most courts2' sus-
15. Id. § 553(a). See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Snow, 561 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hous-
ing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
927 (1973). See generally, Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefts, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1976). Agency attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, to
rely on the section 553(b)(3)(A) exception are numerous. See American Bus Ass'n v. United
States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and cases cited in note 3 supra.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(B), 553(d)(3) (1976). The legislative history of the APA cautions
agencies not to use the good cause exceptions as escape clauses. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 19, 200, 258. Accordingly, courts normally have construed these exceptions narrowly.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
2156 (1980); United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1977); Detroit Edison Co. v.
EPA, 496 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 531 F.2d 1071
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Pent-R-Books, Inc. v. United States
Postal Serv., 328 F. Supp. 297, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Agencies successfully invoked the good
cause exceptions in the following cases: Washington State Farm Bureau v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 296
(9th Cir. 1980); DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 896 (1974). For general discussion of the good cause exceptions, see Comment, Agency
Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal Rulemaking: What Constitutes "Good Cause" Under the
Administrative Procedure Act? 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 93; Note, The "Good Cause" Exceptions: Dan.
ger to Notice and Comment Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 68 GEo. L.J.
765 (1980); Comment, The Good Cause Exceptionsfrom Administrative Rulemaking Requirements:
Divergent Views in the Clean Air Cases, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 624 (1980).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976).
19. Id § 553(d)(3).
20. See, eg., Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1980) (regulation raising annual
payment for oil and gas leases from $.50 to $1.00); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1980)
(regulation attributing to a disabled child certain income of parents or step-parents); United States
v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1977) (regulation placing mecloqualone on list of controlled
substances); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (regulations
creating effluent limitations for potato-processing industry); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole,
507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (regulations concerning parole eligibility); California Citizens
Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967) (FCC regulations pertaining to Citizens
Radio Service).
21. The power of courts to review agency action
may be found in (1) a statute which specifically states that orders or other actions of the
named agency may be reviewed... or contains a general provision for judicial review
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taining such procedural challenges22 immediately invalidate the rule
and remand the case to the agency with instructions to follow proper
section 553 procedures.23 The Court of Appeals for the District of
of administrative action. . . ; or (2) a grant of general jurisdiction--either by statute,
such as a code of procedure, or under the common law or by constitution.
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 917 (7th ed. 1979). This power of
judicial review has been the focus of a plethora of case law and commentary. With respect to
judicial review of agency procedure, the leading case is Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee held generally that a
court must not impose on an agency more restrictive procedures than those required under the
APA. Id. at 524. For comment on and criticism of Vermont Yankee, see 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 2,
§ 6:37 (2d ed. Supp. 1980); Davis, Administrative Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 3; Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
22. An extensive analysis of when a procedural challenge should be sustained is beyond the
scope of this note. Briefly, if an agency unjustifiably fails to meet the procedural requirements
discussed in notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text, it violates section 553. Several courts have
held, however, that a minor deviation from strict section 553 procedures does not amount to a
violation. See National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy Admin., 569 F.2d 1137, 1144 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1977); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 553 F.2d 224, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
23. In most instances, the court declares the rule null and void, apparently following 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1976): "The reviewing court shall... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusion found to be... (D) without observance of procedure required by law." In
some cases, the petitioning party requests equitable relief, and the court enjoins the promulgating
agency from enforcing the challenged rule. See, e.g., Dow Chemical, USA v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 464 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. La. 1979); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Butz, 420 F.
Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1976). Most courts use this remedy as a matter of course, seemingly without
considering whether alternatives are available. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796, 806 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In a few isolated instances prior to United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas, courts left
challenged rules temporarily in effect. For example, in Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975), members of low-income households challenged a food-stamp allocation program that had
been instituted without any of the procedures required by section 553. The court held that the
program was invalidly promulgated and remanded the case, but left the program in effect until a
properly promulgated substitute was in place. Id. at 817, 824. The Rodway court was not, how-
ever, asked to invalidate the program. Although the plaintiffs originally asked the court to enjoin
enforcement of the allocation program because it increased the cost of food stamps, they withdrew
their request after the Department of Agriculture rolled back the price increase. Id. at 812. See
also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 699 (D.D.C. 1974).
One of the rare cases that clearly contradicts the majority rule prior to United States Steel and
Western Oil& Gas is National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). National NutritionalFoods involved a challenge to FDA regulations
that classified certain preparations of vitamins A and D as "prescription drugs" rather than as
food. The court held that the agency had not provided an adequate statement of basis and pur-
pose as required by section 553(c). Instead of invalidating the challenged regulations as the plain-
tiff requested, the court left the regulations in effect and remanded the case for further
proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit criticized the National
Nutritional Foods case at length in Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The Tabor court convincingly demonstrated that the National Nutritional Foods
court misread and misapplied the cases on which it based its decision. Id. at 711-12. It is interest-
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Columbia Circuit followed this practice in Tabor v. Joint Board/or En-
rollment ofActuaries.24
In Tabor, experienced actuaries challenged regulations establish-
ing standards and qualifications for persons performing actuarial serv-
ices for pension plans to which the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 197425 (ERISA) applies.26 The actuaries argued, inter
alia, that the Joint Board had violated section 553 by failing to publish
a statement of basis and purpose with the rules.27 The district court
granted the Board's motion for summary judgment.2 8 The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit reversed, vacating the rules and remanding
the case to the Board "to enable it to adopt new rules accompanied by a
contemporaneous statement of basis and purpose. '29
In United States Steel Corp. v. EPA 30 and Western Oil & Gas Asso-
ciation v. EPA ,31 the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits proposed a new remedy for agency noncompliance with section
553. Both cases arose out of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA). 32 Under the amended CAA, each state submitted to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) a list categorizing the areas of the
ing to note that, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which left the regulations in effect in
National Nutritional Foods, chose in other cases to invalidate challenged rules immediately. See
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Lewis-Mota v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
24. 566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1210 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
26. 566 F.2d at 707. Section 3041 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1241 (1976) directs the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor to establish the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actua-
ries. The Joint Board is to "establish reasonable standards and qualifications for persons perform-
ing actuarial services with respect to plans in which this Act applies." Id. § 1242. Pursuant to this
directive, the Joint Board proposed a set of regulations that was adopted as final on January 14,
1976. 566 F.2d at 707. These regulations were the subject of the Tabor case.
27. Id. at 709-10.
28. Id. at 706.
29. Id. at 712.
30. 649 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1981).
31. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979). For discussion of the 1977 Amendments see
Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 155 (1979).
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1976) (amended
1977), the Administrator of the EPA established air-quality standards for designated air pollu-
tants. The standards have been in force since November 25, 1971 and are codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 50.1 -50.11 (1981). The states were required to develop plans to meet the standards by 1975. In
1977, because the deadline imposed by the 1970 legislation was not met, Congress amended the
CAA to restructure the scheme for attaining the standards set up in 1970. Under the 1977 amend-
ments, the states must meet the air-quality standards for most pollutants by December 31, 1982,42
U.S.C. 7502(a) (Supp. 111 1979), and they must meet the standards for certain other pollutants
(photochemical oxidants or carbon monoxide, or both) by 1987 if earlier attainment proves impos-
sible. Id. § 7502(b).
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state according to the Act's air-quality standards. 33 An area that met
the standards was listed as an "attainment" area; an area that failed to
meet the standards was designated a "nonattainment" area.34 The
EPA Administrator promulgated a final version of the states' lists of
designations35 after making "such modifications as he deem[ed] neces-
sary."36 The states were then to base new plans to attain proper air
quality on the Administrator's final lists. 37
The Amendments called for promulgation of the final lists by Feb-
ruary 3, 1978.38 The EPA did not, however, publish the final lists in the
Federal Register until March 3, 1978.39 This publication, the first pub-
lic notice of the lists, included instructions that they were to be effective
immediately. 40
Following the March 3, 1978 publication, a number of parties peti-
tioned for review of the Administrator's actions in promulgating the
final lists. 4 1 The parties argued that the EPA had not complied with
section 553 because it had published the final lists effective immedi-
ately, without prior notice or a comment period.42 They sought the
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. III 1979).
34. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d at 574. An area that had a nonattainment
designation on the final list became subject to the EPA's "offset" policy. The offset policy, first
mentioned in an interpretive ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976), was adopted in the CAA Amend-
ments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. III 1979). As the United States Steel court noted:
This policy places strict limitations on the construction of new facilities, or the modifica-
tion of existing facilities, that will increase the overall level of pollution emissions in a
nonattainment area. Construction or modification in a nonattainment area will be per-
mitted only if the increase in emissions attributable to the new source would be offset by
a greater decrease in emissions attributable to existing sources. Construction of a new
source of emissions may be disapproved if it will contribute to a violation of air quality
standards in a nearby area.
649 F.2d at 576 n.8.
35. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8962 (1978).
36. The Administrator's derived authority to modify the designations from 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
37. Id. § 7407.
38. Id. § 7407(d).
39. 43 Fed. Reg. 8962 (1978).
40. Id. The publication also stated that the agency would accept post-promulgation com-
ment on the designations and would publish revised designations as appropiate.
41. See, ag., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1981); Western Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980); New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA,
597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), modgfed on
rehearing, 598 F.2d 915 (1979).
42. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d at 573-76; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n
v. EPA, 633 F.2d at 806, 810-12; New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d at 1041-42; Republic Steel Corp. v.
Costle, 621 F.2d at 799, 802-03; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d at 285-86; Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d at 379; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d at 210, 212-13.
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invalidation of the nonattainment designations that affected them.43
The EPA admitted that it did not follow the procedures in section
553,44 but argued that the February 3, 1978 deadline provided suffi-
cient "good cause" under section 553(b)(B) to allow it to forego normal
rulemaking procedures.45
Seven federal courts of appeals considered the petitions. The
EPA's "good cause" argument succeeded in the Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth 46 and Seventh47 Circuits, but failed elsewhere.48 The Courts
of Appeals for the Third,49 Fifth50 and District of Columbia l Circuits
rejected the EPA's good cause argument, invalidated the challenged
designations, and remanded the cases to the agency for proceedings in
compliance with section 553.52 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in United States Steel and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Western Oil & Gas also rejected the EPA's argument, 53 and
43. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d at 577; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
EPA, 633 F.2d at 812; New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d at 1042; Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621
F.2d at 802; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d at 284-85; Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597
F.2d at 378; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d at 210, 213, 218.
44. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8962 (1978). See also United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 574-
75; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d at 805-06, 810; New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d at
1041; Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d at 803; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d
at 286; Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d at 379; United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d at
213-15.
45. When it published the final lists on March 3, 1978, the EPA invoked the "good cause"
exception as follows:
The States are now preparing revisions to their State implementation plans (SIPs) as
required by sections 110(a)(2)(I) and 172 of the Act. This enterprise, which must be com-
pleted by January 1, 1979, requires that the States have immediate guidance as to the
attainment status of the areas designated under section 107(d). Congress has acknowl-
edged this by imposing a tight schedule on the designation process and requiring the
EPA to promulgate the list within 180 days of the enactment of the amendments. Under
these circumstances it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest to ig-
nore the statutory schedule and postpone publishing these regulations until notice and
comment can be effectuated. For this good cause, the Administrator has made these
designations immediately effective.
43 Fed. Reg. 8962 (1978).
46. Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 803-05 (6th Cir. 1980).
47. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 286-90 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1035 (1980).
48. As the split in the circuits indicates, the question of what constitutes good cause under
section 553 is a volatile issue. For discussion of this question, see authorities cited in note 17
supra.
49. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 380-81 (3rd Cir. 1979).
50. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir.), mod#iFedon rehearing, 598
F.2d 915 (1979).
51. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1043-45 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
52. Id at 1050; Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d at 381-82; United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 595 F.2d at 218.
53. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 575-76 (8th Cir. 1981); western Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1980).
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remanded the challenged designations for further proceedings. 5 4
Rather than setting aside the challenged designations immediately,
however, these courts left them in effect pending the EPA's compliance
on remand.55 The courts justified this novel remedy by explaining that
the decision was within their discretion "to shape an equitable rem-
edy," and that the equities weighed in favor of leaving the rules tempo-
rarily in effect.5 6
United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas are unprecedented.5 7
Other courts that sustain procedural challenges to informally promul-
gated rules invalidate the rules pending the outcome of the proceedings
on remand regardless of the equities of the case, but United States Steel
and Western Oil& Gas suggest that courts may use their equitable pow-
ers to protect challenged rules from immediate invalidation. Identifica-
tion of the competing considerations-the reasons both for and against
immediate invalidation-is the first step in evaluating the propriety of
this type of equitable relief following a successful procedural challenge
to an informally promulgated rule.
II. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST IMMEDIATE INVALIDATION OF
IMPROPERLY PROMULGATED RULES
A. Reasons for Leaving Challenged Rules in Effect Pending
Procedures on Remand.
A court fashioning a remedy for agency noncompliance with sec-
tion 553 has two primary reasons for leaving the challenged rule tem-
porarily in effect. First, and most important, leaving a rule in effect
may promote its statutory purpose.58 Second, it may be unreasonable
54. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d at 575-77; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA,
633 F.2d at 810-13.
55. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d at 577; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633
F.2d at 813.
56. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d at 813; See also United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 649 F.2d at 576.
57. It could be argued that these two cases are applications of a section of the CAA Amend-
ments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8) (Supp. III 1979), which provide:
[i]n reviewing alleged procedural errors, the court may invalidate the rule only if the
errors were so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that
there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if
such errors had not been made.
One could argue that the courts in United States Steel and Western 01/ & Gas, both CAA cases,
were merely complying with this statute, and not employing a novel equitable approach. This
argument, however, is flawed. Both courts specifically stated that their choice of remedy was an
exercise of equitable discretion; neither mentioned 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8) (Supp. III 1979). Nor
did either court find that the procedural errors did the substantive damage contemplated by sec-
tion 7607(d)(8).
58. See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
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to invalidate the rule on merely procedural grounds.5 9 The force of
these reasons may vary with both the type of rule challenged and the
type of defect in agency procedure.
Federal agencies promulgate rules to further statutory purposes, 60
and the result of an immediate invalidation of a challenged rule may be
to frustrate the statutory purpose until a substitute rule is in place.
Avoiding this result is a major reason for leaving successfully chal-
lenged rules in effect pending agency action on remand. The strength
of this argument, however, depends on the statutory purpose that the
challenged rule was designed to implement. When the rule promotes an
urgent statutory purpose, the argument is compelling. 6'
Another argument for leaving the rule temporarily in effect is that
it is unjust and unreasonable to allow a mere procedural "technical-
ity"62 to upset an otherwise sound regulatory scheme. Although intui-
tively appealing, this argument is not always persuasive. One of the
functions of section 553 is to improve the substantive accuracy of rules
by ensuring that the promulgating agency considers as much data and
criticism as possible.63 When a rulemaking agency does not accept
comment from interested parties, its rules are of questionable validity.
Thus, a procedural challenge may imply a challenge to the substance of
the rule as well. If the procedural defect does not relate to the notice
and comment provisions of section 553, however, no substantive chal-
lenge should be implied.64 Thus, the propriety of leaving the rule in
effect should vary according to the type of procedural defect.
59. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
60. "Congress often enacts regulatory legislation with broad substantive provisions: enact-
ments, for example, making illegal 'unfair labor practices.' Congress then delegates to an agency
the task of defining precisely the range of proscribed conduct." Mayton, The Legislatie Resolution
of the Rulemaking ersusAdfdication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 104
(footnote omitted). See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 3.01-.13 (1958);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking orAdjudicalion in the Development ofAdministrative Polcy, 78
HARv. L. REV. 921 (1965).
61. A strict statutory deadline may be an indication that Congress considered the statutory
purpose compelling. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 287-89 (5th Cir.
1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (statutory deadline sufficient indication of urgency of
purpose such that "good cause" exception will apply).
62. See United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 1981). See also, notes
118-21 infra and accompanying text. If the petitioner can offer no substantive criticism, the rule
may be substantively sound. If the rule is sound, it presumably will not be changed after notice
and comment on remand. Perhaps it is wasteful to remand the rule in such a case, only to have it
reinstituted later in substantially the same form.
63. See notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text.
64. The notice and comment provisions are the requirements of section 553 that have the
most impact on the content of rules. See notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text. Presumably, if
the agency violates section 553 merely by not publishing a statement of basis and purpose or by
making a rule effective immediately, the substance of the rule is not as likely to be questionable.
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B. Reasons for Immediate Invalidation of Challenged Rules.
There are several reasons for immediately invalidating a chal-
lenged rule following a finding of noncompliance with section 553.
First, because section 553 procedures serve to educate agencies and ap-
prise them of the public interest the rule may be inaccurate and con-
trary to the public interest, and thus unworthy of being extended.
Second, enforcement of a rule that results from improper procedure
runs afoul of fundamental notions of democratic government. 65 Third,
leaving the rule temporarily in effect may have undesirable effects on
the procedures on remand.6 6 Again, the strength of these arguments
varies with the rule being challenged and the type of procedural
violation.
One function of the procedures of section 553 is to help agencies
promulgate more rational, accurate rules by exposing the rulemaking
process to criticism from interested commentators. 67 According to the
Senate Judiciary Committee report on the APA, "[agency] knowledge
is rarely complete, and [the agency] must always learn the . . . view-
points of those whom its regulations will affect. . . .[Plublic participa-
tion ...in the rulemaking process is essential in order to permit
administrative agencies to inform themselves. '68 If a rule is complex or
far-reaching, the risk of inaccuracy increases. With a complex rule, it is
imperative that the agency consider all available comment to ensure
accuracy.69 Similarly, a rule of broad scope affects many individuals
and therefore requires consideration of a wide variety of viewpoints to
define the public interest.70 In our form of government, the public in-
terest is defined by compromise between competing interests in soci-
65. See notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 82-86 infra and accompanying text.
67. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Na-
tional Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978); LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 19-20, 200-01, 358-59. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 101-02 (1941).
68. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 20.
69. See the cases cited at note 41 supra. In those cases, interested parties challenged the
EPA's final designations. The designations were the result of an extensive and elaborate process
of data accumulation. The public was not given an adequate opportunity to comment during this
process, and many of the designations were altered after publication. See text accompanying note
124 infra. The complexity of the designation scheme made public comment a necessity. Presuma-
bly, some of the later alterations of the designations would have been avoided had public com-
ment been allowed See generally, Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376 (notice and comment procedures needed when
complex issues are involved).
70. A narrow, technical rule affects only a small segment of the population with limited inter-
ests. The agency's failure to listen to criticism is less important when the narrow "public" interest
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ety.71 By exposing proposed rules to criticism from interested parties,
section 553 in principle helps agencies fashion rules more nearly in ac-
cordance with the public interest. 72 When a court finds that a rule was
promulgated in violation of section 553, failure to immediately invali-
date it may subject parties to more than thirty days73 of regulation
under a rule that is both inaccurate and contrary to the public interest.
The type of procedural defect has great bearing on the likelihood
that a rule is inaccurate or contrary to the public interest. The notice
and comment provisions of section 553, more than the other provisions,
influence the degree to which rules are accurate and consonant with the
is readily ascertainable. See, e.g., American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
71. Although commentators may disagree about the wisdom of this principle, they generally
agree that it is one of the tenets of liberal democracy.
[A]Ithough the "public interest" cannot be objectively defined, one can safely conclude
that administrators who ignore relevant facts and who take the counsel of blind
prejudice will serve the "public interest" only by the operation of chance. Therefore,
although a rulemaker's decisions cannot be "accurate" in the conventional sense, and
although regulated parties have no fundamental "right" to participate in rulemaking, the
administrator owes a duty to the public to give serious consideration to all reasonable
contentions and evidence pertinent to the rules he is considering.
wright, supra note 69, at 380. See generally Barry, The Public Interest in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM
159, 160 (W. Connolly ed. 1969); Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory in THE BIAs F
PLURALISM, supra, at 3; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (A. Hamilton); Harmon, Administrative Policy
Formulation and the Public Interest, 29 Pun. AD. REv. 483, 485 (1969) ("the public interest is the
continually changing outcome of political activity among individuals and groups within a demo-
cratic political system"); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1230-35
(1966); Note, Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward IncreasedResponsiveness, 13 ARiz.
L. REv. 835, 838-40 (1971).
72. Although the procedures of section 553 expose proposed rules to criticism, the efficacy of
such criticism has been questioned:
Public participation in rulemaking procedures was a part, of course, of the original
notice and comment procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. It is fair to
say, however, that while there is much public participation in such an informal written
comment procedure, it is of a sort which gives only dubious satisfaction. A particular
public comment simply becomes one of a great mass of comments, and there is no overt
reaction by the agency to each comment. Unless the individual commenting is filing
views as part of an organization known to have significant strength before the agency,
the filing of a comment is much akin to dropping a feather into the Grand Canyon and
trying to hear the impact.
Williams, Securing Fairness and Regulariy in Administrative Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REV. 1, 16
(1977).
Concern that administrative agencies are not sufficiently democratic has resulted in a variety
of suggestions for increasing input. See, e.g., Asimow, Public Participation in theAdoption of Inter-
pretative Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MicH. L. REv. 520 (1977); Koch, Public Proceduresfor
the Promulgation ofInterpretative Rules and General Statements of olicy, GEO. L.J. 1047 (1976).
See also Comment, Inducement ofPublic Participation in Administrative Proceedings Through the
Award ofAttorneys' Fees, 30 BAYLOR L. Rav. 785 (1978); Comment, The Needfor an Additional
Notice and Comment Period When Final Rules Differ Substantiallyfrom Interim Rules, 1981 DuKE
LJ. 377.
73. In almost every case, compliance with section 553 on remand requires more than thirty
days, the statutory minimum for promulgation of a new rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
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public interest.74 Hence, if a rule's only procedural flaw is the failure to
print a statement of basis and purpose, concern for its substance should
not compel invalidation.
The procedures of section 553 also serve to keep administrative
agencies accountable and to legitimize agency action. Administrative
agencies occupy a precarious position in a system of government that
values limited power and the rule of law.75 It is a basic principle of
democratic government that the consent of the governed is necessary to
the legitimate exercise of power. Nonetheless, agencies often act as in-
dependent legislatures. 76 To a certain extent, the procedures of section
553 legitimize this agency legislation.77 They ensure that interested
parties are allowed to participate in rulemaking, in effect guaranteeing
a modicum of consent to agency action.78 Another fundamental of
democratic government is that governmental power must be checked.
Agencies have broad discretion when they make rules under the man-
date of vague statutes.79 To counter this discretion, section 553 renders
agencies accountable by requiring them to expose the rulemaking pro-
cess to public scrutiny and to articulate the basis and purpose of their
rules.80
74. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
75. See generally M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967);
Freedman, Crisis andLegitimacy in Administrative Process, 27STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); Stewart,
The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1975).
76. According to the traditional model of the administrative function, agencies were to be
mere "transmission belts," carrying out the instructions of Congress. See Tarlock,Administrative
Law.- Procedural Due Process and Other Issues, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (1980); Stewart, supra
note 75, at 1669-76. The administrative agencies have burgeoned however, into a "veritable
fourth branch" with enormous impact on individuals, FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487
(1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting), impact that is often not stamped with a congressional mandate.
See Stewart, supra note 75, at 1676-88; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 383.
77. See generally Mayton, supra note 60, at 107.
78. See notes 67 & 72 supra and accompanying text.
79. See Stewart, supra note 75, at 1682-85. The problem of keeping agencies accountable has
become acute in recent years. Agencies, according to some commentators, have come to abuse
their discretion by, inter alia, serving the interests of narrow groups rather than those of the gen-
eral public. See generally, G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 336-
68 (1967); Freedman, supra note 75 at 1042.
80. Clearly, Congress intended section 553 to be a restraint on agency power. See LEGISLA-
rwa HISTORY, supra note 7, at 337-38, 349-51, 383-84, 392. In Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, the court
stated: "[t]he agency's discretion, and thus its latitude for promulgating unwise rules, was to be
restrained through this deliberately prescribed process for meaningful comment-a competition of
ideas, which replaced the restraint once performed by the marketplace's competition for profits."
574 F.2d 512, 516 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). Some courts have gone so far as to equate the
procedures of section 553 with due process of law. See, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530
F.2d 982, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.W.Va.
1967). See generally Sinaiko, Due Process Rights of Particpation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63
CAL. L. REV. 886 (1975).
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Rules promulgated under improper procedures are therefore an
affront to fundamental notions of democratic government. When a
court allows such a rule to remain in force, it extends the life of an
illegitimate exercise of power and possibly promotes abuses of agency
power. This argument is especially compelling when the challenged
rule is promulgated under a vague statute. When a vague statute is
involved, the need is great to ensure that the agency remains accounta-
ble, and has not acted beyond its statutory mandate.8'
This reason for immediately invalidating challenged rules will also
vary in force as a function of the type of the procedural defect at issue
in the case. Of the requirements in section 553, the notice and com-
ment provisions play the most important role in legitimizing agency
actions and in keeping agencies accountable. Thus, when an agency
fails to give notice and accept comment, this reason carries greater
weight.
A third reason for immediately invalidating challenged rules fo-
cuses on the effect that leaving them in place is likely to have on the
procedures on remand. In a long line of cases, courts have held that
allowing comment on rules after they have already become effective is
not a satisfactory substitute for pre-promulgation comment.8 2 These
courts reasoned that once a rule is effective, the agency responsible for
the rule is unlikely to consider comments seriously. The agency be-
comes close-minded after making a final determination.8 3 Moreover,
the agency's credibility is at stake; when the rule is in final form the
Proper section 553 procedures theoretically create a record that can be reviewed judicially,
thereby increasing agency accountability. See, eg., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533
F.2d 637, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also, Recent Developments, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 402
(1975). But see Nathanson, Probing the Mind oftheAdministrator: Hearings, Variations and Stan.
dards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754, 754-56 (1975).
81. See Stewart, supra note 75. Professor Stewart argues as follows:
Vague, general, or ambiguous statutes create discretion and threaten the legitimacy of
agency action under the "transmission belt" theory of administrative law. Insofar as
statutes do not effectively dictate agency actions, individual autonomy is vulnerable to
the imposition of sanctions at the unruled will of executive officials, major questions of
social and economic policy are determined by officials who are not formally accountable
to the electorate, and both the checking and validating functions of the traditional model
are impaired. However, rather than being the exception, federal legislation establishing
agency charters has, over the past several decades, often been strikingly broad and non-
specific, and has accordingly generated the very conditions which the traditional model
was designed to eliminate.
Id. at 1676-77 (footnotes omitted).
82. See, eg., Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979); National Tour
Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3rd Cir. 1972); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
83. See cases cited at note 82 supra.
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agency may take a defensive posture.84 This argument also seems to
apply when the rule is not fully effective but only in place temporarily.
Substantial rule revision taxes the agency; a change in the rule requires
altering the machinery of implementation, enforcement, and documen-
tation.85 The agency has good reason to be close-minded once the rule
is remanded. As a result, it is likely that if the rule is not invalidated
immediately the procedures on remand may be a mockery of section
553, with the agency giving little serious consideration to the criticisms
and comments of the interested parties.8 6 Consequently, the perma-
nent rules that result from the remand procedures are likely to be the
temporary rules in a slightly revised form. This is unacceptable be-
cause the temporary rules must be subjected to criticism. As discussed
previously, improperly promulgated rules are possibly inaccurate,8 7
possibly contrary to the public interest,88 and definitely an affront to
notions of proper government.8 9
Both the type of rule and the type of procedural defect in question
affect the force of this argument for invalidation. If, for example, the
rule has caused the agency to erect elaborate enforcement mechanisms,
the agency has increased motive for disregarding criticism.90 Depend-
84. See National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The National Tour Brokers court presented another reason for rejecting post-promulgation
comment:
[A]n individual. . . should have an opportunity to address a proposal before, not after,
a decision on whether it should be implemented has been made. The fact that the matter
has been prejudged might very well discourage disclosure of pertinent points of view.
For example, someone might be inclined to respond to an initial proposal because this
could be done without the aid of professional advice. But he or she might not be simi-
larly inclined to file a petition responding to the proposal's adoption because of a belief
that to do so would require such advice.
Id. at 902 n.24 (quoting Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. 476, 531 (1977)). In Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, the court offered yet another reason: "If a period for comments after the issuance of
a rule could cure a violation of the APA's requirements, an agency could negate at will the Con-
gressional decision that notice and an opportunity for comment must precede promulgation." 597
F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979).
85. Presumably, a change in the temporary rule would require the agency to publish notice of
the change, and to educate agency personnel and regulated members of the public regarding the
change.
86. Of course, if an agency were intent on having a challenged rule in effect in the future, it
would not matter whether the rule was invalidated immediately or left in place during compliance
with section 553. In either situation the agency would disregard comments.
87. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
90. See, eg., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacatedandremanded, 431 U.S.
99 (1977). Maryland involved a challenge to several regulations that were part of a complex plan
devised by the State of Maryland and the EPA for achieving air-quality standards in metropolitan
Baltimore. See id at 217-19. One of the regulations at issue was the Employer's Provision for
Mass Transit Priority Incentives (EMTI). The EMTI plan was devised by the EPA and required
each employer of more than 700 employees within the region to submit to the EPA a plan for
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ing on the procedural defect, however, this argument may be less per-
suasive. If there has been proper notice and comment, the agency's
determination to adhere to its rule may be justifiable. In some situa-
tions, therefore, the two relevant concerns-the type of rule and the
type of procedural defect-may offset each other.
C. The Propriey of Balancing the Competing Considerations.
As the foregoing illustrates, competing considerations confront a
court faced with the decision whether to leave informally promulgated
rules temporarily in effect following a successful procedural challenge.
The question remains, however, whether it is appropriate for courts
making this decision to use their equitable power9' to balance these
considerations. 92 On the one hand, section 706 of the APA93 appears
to preclude courts from using an equitable approach because it appears
to compel immediate invalidation of all rules found to have been im-
properly promulgated. It reads in pertinent part: "The reviewing court
encouraging employees to use mass transportation rather than automobiles. The plan went into
effect on December 12, 1973, without having been mentioned in any previous Maryland or EPA
proposal. Thus, neither the State of Maryland nor the general public was afforded an opportunity
to comment on the plan before it went into effect. The EPA did, however, offer to accept post-
promulgation comments. Id at 221.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the EMTI plan invalid "as a result of the
lack of notice ... and failure to comply with the notice and publication requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)." Id. at 222. The court explained that "[t]he
reception of comments after all the crucial decisions have been made is not the same as permitting
active and well prepared criticism to become a part of the decision-making process." Id.
In Maryland, the controlling consideration in the remedy decision was the effect of that deci-
sion on the procedures on remand. Considering the complexity of the statutory scheme involved,
see id. at 218-19, the agency would have been tempted to ignore postpromulgation comment in
order not to disrupt the overall plan and lose face. See note 85 supra and text accompanying notes
83-85 supra. Notably, the regulations challenged in this case are still in effect. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.1105 (1981).
91. It is well established that a court considering a petition for review of an agency action
"may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable principles
governing judicial action." Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939). Accord, Sharon
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979); Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n, 502 F.2d 336, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
Although Ford Motor Co. has been read to hold that the power to fashion equitable remedies
in these cases is vested in the courts of appeals, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 441 (3d
ed. 1972), it is not clear whether a district court could also use the balancing approach suggested
here. As a practical matter, however, it is of no great import that the district courts may not have
this power. The overwhelming majority of actions for review of agency rules are brought in the
appellate courts. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 21, at 917-19.
92. Manifestly, equity would require the court making this decision to balance the competing
considerations. As Justice Frankfurter phrased it: "It is always the duty of a court of equity to
strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the
desired relief." Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... (D) without observance of procedure re-
quired by law." 94 On the other hand, the courts in United States Steel
Corp.95 and Western Oil & Gas96 used their equitable discretion un-
hesitatingly and left the designations temporarily in effect pending
agency action on remand.
The approach taken by the United States Steel and Western Oil &
Gas courts is preferable. First, section 706 probably does not apply to
the specific question of whether courts can leave rules in effect during
the procedures on remand.97 Along with the above-quoted language,
section 706 contains a provision that requires reviewing courts to take
"due account. . . of the rule of prejudicial error." 98 According to the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the APA, this provision
"means that a procedural omission which has been cured by affording
the party the procedure to which he was originally entitled is not a
reversible error."99 Although the Report speaks in terms of omissions
that have been cured, it seems equally applicable to omissions that will
be cured. Accordingly, because successful challengers to informally
promulgated rules are guaranteed proper procedures on remand, 100 the
procedural omissions found by the courts in these cases probably do
not constitute reversible error. Thus, section 706 very likely does not
compel courts to invalidate rules immediately.
A second reason for rejecting the notion that section 706 precludes
courts from leaving challenged rules temporarily in effect hinges on the
function of the quoted portion of section 706. Section 706(2)(D) is an
enforcement provision for the APA; its essential function is to promote
the purposes of the procedural requirements of the APA. With regard
to section 553, this portion of section 706 is designed to ensure that
rulemaking is informed' 01 and legitimate.'0 2 Hence, there is little pur-
pose to be served by applying this provision in cases in which the
rulemaking process has been substantially informed and legitimate. In
such cases the reasons for leaving the rules temporarily in effect out-
94. Id.
95. 649 F.2d572, 577 (8th Cir. 1981).
96. 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980).
97. This would explain why courts invalidating successfully challenged rules so seldom refer
to section 706. See generally note 23 supra and accompanying text.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
99. LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 7, at 214.
100. The quality of the procedures on remand, however, will not always be satisfactory to the
challenging party. See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text, and notes 131-34 infra and ac-
companying text.
101. See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
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weigh the reasons for invalidating them immediately. 10 3 When the
competing considerations weigh heavily in favor of leaving the rules in
effect, immediately invalidating challenged rules will not promote the
purposes of section 553 to any appreciable extent. Enforcing section
706(2)(D) in such cases is likely to have undesirable effects. Thus, be-
cause the purpose of section 706 should not require immediate invali-
dation in every instance, section 706 should not bar courts from using
an equitable approach.
III. EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES STEEL AND
WESTERN OIL & GAS
The United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas courts departed
from precedent by choosing the equitable remedy of leaving the chal-
lenged designations in effect. 104 In support of this novel remedy choice,
the Western Oil & Gas court explained that it did not want to interfere
with "the operation of the Clean Air Act in the State of California."u s
The United States Steel court followed this reasoning 06 and offered a
second reason for not immediately invalidating the challenged designa-
tions.107 Noting that United States Steel had not challenged the merits
of the designations, the court wrote that it was "appropriate" to leave
the designations in effect because "United States Steel had elected to
rest its challenge. . . primarily on procedural grounds."' 08
The United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas courts touched on
two previously described reasons for leaving rules in effect-promotion
of statutory purpose and the inequity of invalidating for procedural
reasons alone. They did not, however, adequately discuss several other
considerations that should have influenced the remedy decision. More-
over, their reliance on statutory purpose and equitable considerations
may have been unjustified.10 9
103. In other words, the reasons for leaving the rules in effect, see text accompanying notes 58-
64supra, would:carry some weight, but the first two reasons for invalidating, see text accompany-
ing notes 67-81 supra, would already have been satisfied.
104. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
105. 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980).
106. 649 F.2d 572, 576-77 (8th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 577.
108. Id.
109. See notes 112-17 infra and accompanying text.
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A. Competing Considerations Facing the United States Steel and
Western Oil & Gas Courts. Reasonsfor Leaving the
Designations in Effect.
The courts' desire to promote statutory purposes weighed heavily
in the remedy decision in both United States Steel and Western Oil &
Gas"10 This emphasis on statutory purposes was justified in principle;
Congress made clear in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) that it considered clean air to be of crucial importance."' How-
ever, invalidating the challenged designations would not necessarily
have frustrated the purposes of the Amendments." 2 The final goal of
the Amendments was the attainment of certain air-quality standards. " 3
The states were to use the designations as the basis for formulating
state-wide plans by 1979 to implement, maintain, and enforce the stan-
dards." 4 The designations also triggered an offset policy, in effect lim-
iting pollution from new or modified sources in nonattainment areas.' 5
Thus, if the challenged designations had been invalidated, the
goals of the CAA Amendments might have been hindered because first,
the states would temporarily have had incomplete information with
which to formulate their implementation plans, and second, the pollu-
110. See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
111. The strict statutory deadlines set up by the Amendments show that it was Congress's
desire to achieve clean air as expeditiously as possible. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (Supp. III 1979). See
generally Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 804 (6th Cir. 1980); United States Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. See generally Comment, Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal Rulemaking:
What Constitutes "Good Cause" under the Administrative Procedure Act?, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 93,
111-12.
Other courts that considered the challenges to the EPA's list of designations, see note 41
supra, gave conflicting accounts of the effect immediate invalidation would have had on the func-
tioning of the CAA. For example, compare the following statements:
We note that if we were to remand in this case, the entire deadline scheme would be
thrown into complete disarray. State Implementation Plans, which were scheduled to be
(and presumably were) formulated by January 1, would have to be further delayed while
the EPA proceeded with yet another notice and comment period, and after promulgation
of those designations states would have to repeat the hearing-consultation process in
order to resubmit implementation plans. . . . [Riemand in this case would permit U.S.
Steel to continue the very procrastination which Congress sought to end.
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 287, 288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979);
[Trhe respective states already had most of the information contained in the EPA's desig-
nations, since those designations were based on submissions by the states. The statute
indicates that the EPA's role is limited to reviewing the state designations and modifying
them where necessary .... The states could have begun the revisions [of their imple-
mentation plans] with the information on hand, changing them later as required by EPA
alterations of the §§ 7407(d) list.
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir.), mod#Fedon rehearing, 598 F.2d 915
(5th Cir. 1979).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7502 (Supp. 1111979).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7503 See note 34 supra.
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tion level might have increased in nonattainment areas because the off-
set restrictions would not have applied. It was not shown, however, in
either United States Steel or Western Oil & Gas that invalidation for the
amount of time required for compliance with section 553 would have
put statutory deadlines out of reach.1 16 Nor was there any evidence
that the pollution levels would have increased greatly as a result of the
lack of offset restrictions in the areas in question.'
1 7
The United States Steel court reasoned that it is inappropriate to
invalidate a rule on primarily procedural grounds.'1 8 Considering the
facts of the case, the court was justified in its analysis. United States
Steel's challenge was primarily procedural." 9 "[O]f the three mining
companies... who challenged the EPA's initial nonattainment desig-
nations, only U.S. Steel did not submit detailed information to support
its claim that the designations should be modified."' 20 Because United
States Steel waived its opportunity to object to the substance of the
designations, its procedural challenge arguably did not call the sub-
stance of the designations into question.'
2
'
B. Competing Considerations Facing the United States Steel and
Western Oil & Gas Courts. Reasonsfor Invalidating the
Designations Immediately
A successfully challenged rule may be both inaccurate and con-
trary to the public interest.' 22 This consideration should have influ-
enced the United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas decisions. There
was a substantial risk that the designations challenged in both cases
were inaccurate. The designations challenged in United States Steel
116. In United States Steel the challenged designations related to an area comprising only 25
square miles. 649 F.2d at 573 n.2. Hence, Minnesota would probably not have been substantially
hindered in formulating an implementation plan. See also United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595
F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir.), mod#fed on rehearing 598 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1979).
117. The cases do not indicate what effect removing the offset restrictions would have had on
the areas in question. One can speculate that United States Steel or Western Oil and Gas might
have constructed or modified their facilities to the detriment of air quality.
118. 649 F.2d at 577. The court did not explicitly state why the "primarily" procedural chal-
lenge did not merit invalidation of the designations. It is a fair inference, however, that the court
thought it would be inequitable to invalidate on the basis of a procedural challenge alone, since




121. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The Western Oil& Gas court failed to address
this reason for leaving the designations in effect. The opinion does not reveal whether Western
Oil and Gas had the same opportunity to comment that United States Steel had.
122. See notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text.
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related to the Mesabi Iron Range area of Minnesota. 23 Six months
after United States Steel commenced its action against the EPA, a new
study of the air quality in the area was commissioned, 24 which implies
that the original designations were inaccurate. According to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the designations challenged in West-
ern Oil & Gas were "hastily drafted."' 25 The court was not satisfied
with the designations "on substantive grounds."'
126
The United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas courts were appar-
ently not concerned that by leaving the designations in effect they were
extending the life of an illegitimate agency action. The EPA avoided
all of the section 553 procedures in the promulgation of the designa-
tions,' 27 thereby violating the principles of legitimization and accounta-
bility.' 28 This reason for invalidation should have been considered in
the two decisions. Because the CAA Amendments of 1977 were quite
explicit, however, the EPA had a clear congressional mandate to pro-
mulgate the designations. 29 The need for EPA accountability was
therefore not as great as it would have been had the statute been vague.
Similarly, the designation presumably did not adversely affect vital in-
terests of either United States Steel or Western Oil and Gas. As a re-
sult, the need for legitimization was not as great as it could have
been.' 30 It should therefore have been a comparatively minor factor in
the United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas decisions.
The United States Steel court, but not the Western Oil & Gas court,
indirectly dealt with the negative effect that leaving the designations in
place would "have on the procedures on remand. United States Steel
argued that the EPA and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
would "feel no compulsion to act expeditiously on remand"' 3' unless
123. 649 F.2d at 573.
124. Id. at 573 n.3.
125. 633 F.2d at 806.
126. Id.
127. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
128. See generally notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
129. The Amendments specifically instructed the EPA to promulgate the final lists. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407 (Supp. HI 1979). Hence, in promulgating the lists the EPA was not legislating on its own
but merely carrying out a congressional directive. The decisions would have been more question-
able if Congress had delegated to the EPA the power to protect the environment and the EPA had
contrived the designation scheme itself.
130. United States Steel and Western Oil& Gas do not discuss in detail what harm or expense
the two companies would have suffered if the offset policy were in effect. Presumably, the harm
could not have been great. The offset policy was not an absolute bar to construction or modifica-
tion. The only restriction was that the building or modification could not increase pollutant levels.
See note 34 supra. But see United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1979)
("the designations have consequences... that constitute a substantial injury to the petitioners").
131. 649 F.2d at 577.
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the designations were invalidated. In response, the court directed the
two agencies "to promptly hear and resolve the existing controversy
and to consider United States Steel's comments without regard to the
nonattainment designations that we have permitted to remain in ef-
fect."' 32 The court was, of course, correct to give such directions. The
EPA had motive to disregard United States Steel's comments because
changing the temporary designations required a substantial effort.
133
Furthermore, because there had been no previous notice and comment,
the need was great for full section 553 procedures on remand.1 34 By
instructing the agency to consider United States Steel's comments
fully 135 the court at least attempted to minimize the chance that the
temporary designations would go untested. Since there was a substan-
tial risk that the designations were inaccurate, 136 and since there had
been no previous criticism,' 37 it was important that the designations be
subjected to criticism.
IV. CONCLUSION
After sustaining a procedural challenge to a rule promulgated by a
federal administrative agency, courts must fashion a remedy. The con-
fficting considerations involved in fashioning this remedy require a bal-
ancing approach. The courts should follow the lead of the eighth and
ninth circuits in United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas and adopt
such an approach.
The courts should recognize, however, that the United States Steel
and Western Oil & Gas courts failed to properly apply this balancing
approach. They neither articulated nor considered all of the reasons
for or against invalidating. Moreover, they attached inordinate weight
to promoting the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Nevertheless,
the basic approach of both courts was correct, and there is no indica-
tion that such an approach will not work well in the future. As courts
become more accustomed to evaluating the competing concerns in




133. See generally text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
134. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
135. 649 F.2d at 577.
136. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
137. See 649 F.2d at 574. Consequently, the need to have the designations tested was greater
than it would have been had the procedural problem been minor.
[Vol. 1982:461
